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“As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought
to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same
nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached,
there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to
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“The whole world is coming,
A nation is coming, a nation is coming,
The Eagle has brought the message to the tribe.
The father says so, the father says so.
Over the whole earth they are coming.
The buffalo are coming, the buffalo are coming,
The Crow has brought the message to the tribe,
The father says so, the father says so.”
Sioux Ghost Dance Chant 2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Responding to the Realist Critique of the Federal Trust Doctrine
An old European history professor of mine described
Charlemagne’s ninth century Holy Roman Empire as “neither holy, nor
Roman, nor an empire.” 3 Likewise, legal critics of the federal trust duty
characterize it, like the Holy Roman Empire of old, as a legal and political
oxymoron. In all candor, they say, it is neither federal, nor a trust, nor a
“duty.” These realist critics argue that the federal trust duty has proven to
be a largely illusory doctrinal resource for the Indian peoples’ protection. 4
They claim, with justification, that it has failed to protect from federal
depredation or despoliation what the Indian peoples value most—their
lands, their rights of self-governance, and their cultural and religious
freedoms. 5
As proof of their claim, the critics cite the ominous conclusion by
one of the trust doctrine’s most ardent advocates, Professor Reid Peyton
Chambers. Chambers concluded in perhaps the leading law review article
1.
ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY III
(Pantheon Bks. 2000).
2.
FREDERICK TURNER, BEYOND GEOGRAPHY: THE WESTERN SPIRIT
AGAINST THE WILDERNESS 290 (Viking Press 1980).
3.
Voltaire is credited with coining this clever phrase in the eighteenth
century. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 174.
4.
Because the Lone Wolf doctrine authorizes Congress to unilaterally
abrogate Indian treaties or agreements and thereby take Indian lands or resources at
will, some legal commentators deem the federal trust doctrine as being legally
insufficient to protect the Indian peoples from future governmental abuse of the
federal plenary power doctrine. See Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth
Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L.
REV. 245, 254–55 (1982).
5.
See id.

DYING DOCTRINE PROOF (Do Not Delete)

212

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 12:21 PM

Special Issue

on this subject: “This power of Congress recognized under the Lone Wolf
rendition of the [Indian] trust responsibility is manifestly awesome,
perhaps unlimited . . . . For while courts recognize that Congress has a trust
responsibility, they uniformly regard it as essentially a moral obligation,
without justiciable standards for its enforcement.” 6
See, the critics say, even the most ardent advocate of this doctrine
admits that the federal courts will idly sit by as a future Congress may
decide, in its wisdom as the Indian peoples’ guardian, to embark on a new
and starkly pro-assimilationist Indian program that once again shrinks the
land base reserved to the Indian peoples. 7
But even more disturbing, these critics argue, is Professor
Chambers’ supposed remedial approach that ostensibly blunts the adverse
future impacts of Congress’ exercise of its plenary power over Indian lands
and resources. Chambers draws a practical distinction between what he
views as the judicially enforceable Indian trust obligations owed by the
federal executive to the Indian peoples as against the judicially nonenforceable moral obligations that Congress owes to the Indian peoples. 8
Chambers asserts that the federal trust duty is the appropriate
judicial means for regulating federal administrative behaviors and
regulatory actions undertaken by the now multifarious federal “Indian
agents” who are charged with carrying out congressionally declared Indian
policies. 9 In his law review article on the subject, Chambers states:
If, as the Cherokee cases suggest, a chief objective of the
trust responsibility is to protect tribal status as selfgoverning entities, executive extinguishment of the tribal
land base diminishes the territory over which tribal
authority is exercised and thereby imperils fulfillment of
the guarantee of tribal political and cultural autonomy. If
this is the correct interpretation of the trust responsibility,
equitable relief in appropriate cases seems essential. Such
relief is particularly vital to accommodate the conflicts
between Indian trustee responsibilities and competing

6.
Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1226–27 (1975) (footnote omitted).
7.
Newton illustrates this point by hypothesizing a contemporary Indian
allotment act that once again shrinks the Indian peoples’ reserved land base. She
argues that nothing in present federal Indian law would effectively prevent Congress
from doing so. Newton, supra note 4, at 261–63.
8.
Chambers, supra note 6, at 1247–48.
9.
Id.
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government projects that affect countless federal
agencies. 10
Aside from the obvious comment that it probably doesn’t make a
real difference to the affected Indian people whether it is Congress or the
federal executive who acted wrongfully in extinguishing their tribal land
base, the realist critics level a more serious and potentially devastating
charge against Chambers’ supposed remedial theory and approach for the
judicial enforcement of the federal trust duty. 11 The critics contend that,
as far as the United States Supreme Court is concerned given its recent
decision in United States v. Navajo Nation, 12 there is no independent legal
basis for imposing liability on federal Indian trust administrators for their
alleged mismanagement of Indian trust resources, apart from any such
liability specifically created by statutory imposition. 13 If Indian
advocates—and I count myself in their company—are to continue to
espouse the federal trust doctrine as a meaningful legal resource for the
Indian peoples, then I believe we must respond to what the legal realists
regard as their devastating criticisms of that ostensible doctrine. Because
I do believe that a vibrant and judicially enforceable federal trust doctrine
is essential to the future cultural and social survival of the Indian peoples,
a concerted scholarly inquiry must be undertaken by Indian advocates to
respond to the realist critique of this doctrine.
There are two possible honest responses, I believe, to the realists’
claims about the illusory character of the federal trust duty. Option one
requires us to work internally, “inside history” so to speak, in an effort to
breathe new life into the dying federal trust doctrine. This content-based
approach, as I call it, seeks to reconnect the contemporary federal trust
duty doctrine to those foundational Indian law principles established by
the historic treaty-making era between the Indian peoples and the federal
government.
Only by reconnecting these historic principles to
contemporary federal Indian law can a meaningful content be conferred
on a now empty federal trust doctrine.
10.
Id. at 1236 (footnote omitted).
11.
See generally Paul Frye, A Travesty of a Mockery of a Sham: The
Federal Trust Duty and Indian Self-Determination, ROCKY MT. SPEC. INST. ON NAT.
RESOURCES DEV. & ENVTL. REG. IN INDIAN COUNTRY, PAPER NO. 2-B (unpublished
manuscript 1999) (copy on file with author).
12.
537 U.S. 488 (2003) (“Navajo Nation”).
13.
The Navajo Nation Court held that “[t]o state a litigable claim, a tribal
plaintiff must invoke a rights-creating source of substantive law that ‘can fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages
sustained.”’ Id. at 503 (quoting U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983) (“Mitchell
II”)).
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The content-based approach argues that the foremost principle of
federal Indian law, that of inherent tribal sovereignty, was wrongfully
disregarded and disrespected by the federal government during the Indian
allotment and forced assimilation era of the late nineteenth century. It is
this key principle that must be restored as the centerpiece of any revitalized
federal trust doctrine. But for this content based approach to succeed, its
advocates must meet the realists’ charge that tribal sovereignty was
judicially “killed off” during the federal Indian allotment and assimilation
era of the late nineteenth century. According to the realist critics, it was
replaced by the federal plenary power doctrine, the very doctrine that
Professor Chambers admits is alive and well today.
Option two requires us to work externally, “outside of history” so
to speak. I call this the process-based approach to revitalizing the federal
trust doctrine. It works outside of history on two levels. First, it
appropriates those legal fictions created by Chief Justice John Marshall in
his famed trilogy of Indian law opinions 14 as ahistorical and timeless ideals
that should govern the modern development of the federal trust doctrine.
Second, it candidly admits that Marshall’s ideals can only be realized in
an ahistorical era—one free from those destructive biases, prejudices, and
conflicts that doomed the historic trust-based relationship between the
federal government and the Indian peoples. This approach argues that
Marshall’s original ideation of the Indian peoples as “domestic dependent
nations” did not contemplate their future integration or assimilation into
American legal or political society. Indeed, in Marshall’s scheme of
things, he thought it highly unlikely that they could be successfully
integrated into any future American society. Instead, his legal opinions
argue that the Indian peoples were guaranteed by their natural inherent
right, as well as by relevant federal treaties, to remain as the discovering
Europeans had found them—culturally unassimilable and politically
distinct Indian peoples. 15 More remarkably, Marshall’s opinions
guaranteed the Indian peoples the active and permanent protection of a
federal trustee who was charged with ensuring that the Indian peoples
could forever maintain their “once and future” status as culturally and
politically distinct entities within the growing American state. 16
14.
See Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Ga.,
30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
15.
The Indian peoples “had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities.” Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
16.
Id. at 561–62 (“[T]reaties . . . guaranty to them all the land within
their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens
from trespassing on it; and recognize the pre-existing power of the [Indian] nation to
govern itself.”).
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Marshall’s opinions guaranteeing the Indian peoples’ timeless
right to remain culturally and socially distinct entities, oblivious to the
obvious ravages of overweening federal Indian policies of the late
nineteenth century, represent the process based approach to justifying the
contemporary judicial creation and enforcement of a comprehensive and
fully enforceable federal trust duty. 17 Viewed in this light, Indian selfdetermination, the federal government’s contemporary Indian policy,
represents the legally necessary, but not practically sufficient, predicate
for the future realization of Marshall’s ahistorical vision of the Indian
peoples as “domestic dependent nations.” 18
B. Defending the Value of Scholarly Theorizing in the Federal Indian
Law Context
Well-informed friends of mine believe that the bitter historical
experiences of the Indian peoples, resulting in part from the federal
government’s wrong-headed Indian allotment and anti-tribal programs of
the late nineteenth century, can never be redressed by any contemporary
federal Indian policy. Why then, they ask, do I, as an Indian person and
Indian law teacher, expend so much effort to theorize and write about the
federal trust doctrine and Indian self-determination? The “Indian fatalist”
part of me sympathizes with and understands their point of view. But the
“Indian law teacher” part of me is so unduly irked by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s seemingly cavalier opinion in Navajo Nation that I will not rest
until I respond in detail to what I believe are her mistaken assumptions
about the incompatible nature of the federal trust duty and Indian selfdetermination. 19
My essay evaluates the prospects for a revitalized federal trust
doctrine that will complement the Indian peoples’ efforts to realize a
meaningful measure of self-determination. I conclude that Justice
17.
Professor Wood’s modern re-conception of the federal trust duty as
encompassing a sovereign trust in favor of Indian self-determination embodies this
ideal. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A
New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 109, 139–49.
18.
Once fully sovereign peoples, the Indian peoples were reduced to
“domestic dependent nations” upon their political incorporation into the United States.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
19.
Justice Ginsburg concludes that because “[t]he IMLA aims to
enhance tribal self-determination by giving Tribes, not the Government, the lead role
in negotiating mining leases with third parties . . . ‘the ideal of Indian selfdetermination is directly at odds with Secretarial control over leasing.’” Id. at 508
(quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S., 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 230 (2000)).
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Ginsburg’s opinion in Navajo Nation should be restricted to the peculiar
facts of that case and should not be read as precluding the future
development of a vibrant federal trust doctrine that serves as an essential
complement to the shared federal-Indian goal of self-determination.
Indeed, unless the Supreme Court contemplates a perpetual state
of federal governmental wardship for the large majority of the Indian
peoples, it must work toward an effective legal synthesis of Marshall’s two
concepts—the federal trust duty and Indian self-determination. Congress’
strong support for Indian self-determination must be matched by, in my
estimation, an equally strong judicial commitment to define and enforce
the federal trust duty. Given Congress’ declaration that the Indian
peoples’ trust relationship with the federal government would not be
jeopardized if they chose to pursue self-determination, I believe Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion in Navajo Nation is manifestly out of step with
contemporary federal Indian policy.
That most famous proponent of Indian self-determination,
President Richard M. Nixon, proclaimed in his 1970 Indian message to
Congress, that the Indian peoples need not fear the loss of their rightful
claims to the active involvement and help of their trustee, the federal
government, if they decided to work towards self-determination. 20
Furthermore, absent a judicially enforced federal trust doctrine, today’s
“alphabet soup” of federal executive agencies—the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”), Army Corps of Engineers (“ACOE”), Bureau of
Reclamation (“BOR”), Fish & Wildlife Service (“F&WS”), Forest Service
(“USFS”), and National Park Service (“NPS”)—will likely exhibit little
willingness or interest in developing effective “government-togovernment” relationships with the Indian peoples within their respective
jurisdictions.21
20.
President Nixon’s 1970 Indian Message emphasized that “[t]he time
has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era
in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.” H.R.
Doc. 91-363, 91st Cong. 1 (July 8, 1970) (Message from the President of the United
States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy). Nixon’s message goes on
to say that the federal government “must make it clear that Indians can become
independent of Federal control without being cut off from Federal concern and Federal
support.” Id. at 3.
21.
Professor Mary Wood includes these federal agencies within the
doctrinal compass of the federal trust duty because their “actions . . . may profoundly
affect Indian land, even though the effects are incidental in that they result from
general government actions not directed toward tribes or their reservations.” See Mary
Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1527. She rightfully concludes, in my
estimation, that the federal courts have “envince[d] a strong willingness to impose a
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While I am personally reluctant to be drawn into the “how to”
discussion of Indian self-determination, I believe that the two reasons
above justify the Supreme Court’s declaration of a new judicial canon of
Indian statutory construction. Under this proposed canon, federal judges
would be required to presume that the existing and future Indian selfdetermination statutes, such as the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938
(“IMLA”), 22 preserve the historic rights Indians have traditionally enjoyed
under the federal trust relationship unless Congress clearly expresses its
intent to the contrary within the “four corners” of a given Indian statute.
This new canon is the practical and logical corollary of Congress’ declared
“two track” approach to Indian self-determination. Track one encourages
the Indian peoples to assert their inherent rights of self-governance and
economic or social self-determination. Track two assures the Indian
peoples that needed technical and financial support will be forthcoming
from the federal government to assist them in their efforts. 23
The plan of my essay is divided into several parts. Part Two
explores the Marshallian roots of both the federal trust doctrine and Indian
self-determination ideal. I argue that, like Romulus and Remus, 24 the trust
doctrine and self-determination ideal are inseparable twins born together
from Marshall’s famed trilogy. Part Three assesses the rise of the federal
plenary power doctrine and its role in fostering the growth of what I call
the “Indian administrative state.” 25 I argue that it was the de facto
extension of federal administrative control over every aspect of Indian
peoples’ lives during the late nineteenth century that prompted the
Supreme Court to recognize an asserted federal plenary power over the
Indian peoples’ lands and societies. 26 Part Four of my essay analyzes the
trust duty to protect Indian lands and corollary resources from adverse agency action
of an incidental nature.” Id. at 1532. However, I am troubled by her conclusion that
her “expansive approach may not carry over to Tucker Act claims for damage to tribal
lands or resources resulting from federal incidental actions in the post-Mitchell era.”
Id. I worry that she is endorsing, perhaps indirectly, the contemporary Supreme
Court’s “two tier” theory of federal liability for breaches of the federal government’s
fiduciary or trust obligations to the Indian peoples.
22.
52 Stat. 347 (1938).
23.
See generally Wood, supra note 17, at 139–49.
24.
Romulus and Remus, in Roman mythology, are the twin founders of
Rome. Raised by a defiant mother wolf who, apparently against the grain of “wolf
tradition,” refused to kill and devour the two orphaned boys, she, instead, chose to
raise them as her own cubs.
25.
I have described the BIA’s “assumption by default” of administrative
and practical control over the Indian peoples’ lives, and resources during the late
nineteenth century in an earlier law review article. See Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich
Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893 (2000).
26.
Id.
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contemporary Supreme Court’s rediscovery of Marshall’s concept of the
federal trust doctrine. I argue that it was the accumulated horrific evidence
of federal administrative abuse and disregard of the Indians’ inherent
rights and interests that compelled the Supreme Court to rediscover the
federal trust doctrine. 27
Part Five of my essay examines the judicial discomfort and
ambivalence exhibited in the Supreme Court’s failure to develop a “hard
muscled” federal trust doctrine as a means of judicially policing the
contemporary federal-Indian relationship. I argue that the Court’s
perceived conflict between the federal agencies’ “public representational”
responsibilities and those agencies’ “Indian representational” duties
resulted in a substantial watering down of the federal trust relationship
with the Indian peoples. 28
Part Six of my essay critiques Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in
Navajo Nation. I argue that her opinion misconceives the appropriate and
complementary relationship between the federal trust duty and the
contemporary policy of Indian self-determination. I conclude my essay
with a brief sketch of a recommended judicial synthesis of these two
ageless doctrines of federal Indian law.

27.

In a more recent law review article, I make the same point:

But by the advent of the New Deal Era in the 1930s, America’s
western frontier had long since closed. In 1934, Congress
repudiated its Indian allotment policy and adopted fundamental
Indian land and governmental reforms as the hallmark of its
“Indian New Deal.” These reforms were intended to promote the
new federal policy of tribal economic development and political
self-determination. . . . A judicial rethinking of the Johnson-Lone
Wolf line of decisions that had made Indian allotment and the
surplus lands sales possible seemed likewise justified.
Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian
Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 466–67 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
28.
Professor David H. Getches and others questions whether the Court,
in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), reasoned that “a lesser standard
necessarily applies to the Indian trust duty when the [Interior] Secretary has to serve
competing legitimate public interests.” See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 342–43 (4th ed., West 1998).
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II. EXPLORING THE MARSHALLIAN ROOTS OF THE TWIN
CONCEPTS OF THE FEDERAL TRUST DUTY AND INDIAN SELFDETERMINATION
Option one requires us to examine the history of the federal trust
doctrine. My goal is to trace, and hopefully thereby explain, the
contemporary Supreme Court’s conceptual distinction between two
aspects of the federal trust duty: the “generalized” Indian trust relationship
that creates no enforceable legal rights against the United States and the
“specific” Indian trust relationship that may create enforceable legal rights
in the Indian peoples. 29 I criticize this distinction as reifying those antiIndian biases and prejudices of the late nineteenth century and as
fundamentally at odds with the contemporary congressional policies that
are strongly supportive of Indian self-determination.
A. Why Indian Advocates Rightfully Seized on the Federal Trust Doctrine
as the Appropriate Means to Ensure the Indian Peoples’ Cultural and
Political Survival
The contemporary Supreme Court’s schizophrenic distinction
between the “generalized” federal trust duty on the one hand and the
“specific” federal trust duty on the other derives, in my mind, directly from
the anti-Indian policies and precedent of the late nineteenth century.
Indian advocates understandably reject this schizophrenic distinction as
fundamentally irreconcilable with Chief Justice Marshall’s trilogy of
Indian law opinions. His opinions, after all, are the common doctrinal
source of both the contemporary federal trust duty and Indian selfdetermination doctrines. Indeed, Marshall viewed these two doctrines as
inextricably and perpetually linked as the opposite sides of the same
doctrinal coin. It is no surprise that the traditional Indian rights today
agitate for a restoration of a federal trust doctrine that takes full account of
Marshall’s twin conceptions of the historic federal-Indian relationship.
My historical critique of today’s schizophrenic federal trust
doctrine argues that the judicial development of the now two hundred year
long federal-Indian relationship should have reflected the unfolding of
these twin Marshallian principles. A “full blooded” federal trust duty
doctrine should have developed that would have either obviated or
mitigated the ravages inflicted by the federal government’s anti-Indian
29.
What I characterize as the contemporary Supreme Court’s “twotrack” theory of the federal trust duty doctrine originated in what is now known as the
Mitchell line of decisions. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206; United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535 (1980) (“Mitchell I”).

DYING DOCTRINE PROOF (Do Not Delete)

220

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 12:21 PM

Special Issue

policies of the late nineteenth century. Such a “hard muscled” federal trust
doctrine would have recognized and responded to the following social and
political realities that characterized the federal-Indian relationship of that
era:
1. The growth of federal power over the internal affairs of
the Indian peoples: Federal power over the legal and
political status of the Indian peoples grew steadily more
intrusive during the late nineteenth century so as to
eventually encompass virtually every facet of Indian life
within Indian country. 30
2. The deepened vulnerability of the Indian peoples to
federal power: The Indian peoples’ deepened
vulnerability to this growing federal power over their
lives and resources during the late nineteenth century
rendered them legally and practically dependent on the
“good faith” of the federal government to exercise that
power in their best interests. 31
3. Federal agencies’ wrongful and largely unregulated
exercise of a diffuse and broad discretion over the Indian
peoples’ lives and resources: Congress’ de jure and de
facto delegation of its Indian trusteeship power to socalled “Indian” agencies during the late nineteenth
century created a bureaucratically-led “shadow”
government that effectively displaced the traditional self-

30.
I earlier explained the federal government’s anti-Indian policies of
the 1880s to the 1930s in these terms:
The federal government’s resulting war on tribalism from the
1880s to the 1930s resymbolized the complex, life-affirming,
cultural and social practices of diverse Indian peoples as the major
road block to their assimilation into American society. But freeing
up Indian lands for non-Indian use, rather than emancipating
individual tribal members from the clutches of superstition and
communal land holding, was the real goal of the 1880s Indian
reform movement.
Cross, supra note 25, at 908 (footnotes omitted).
31.
Professor Getches concludes that, during the late nineteenth century,
“[a] consensus developed—among non-Indians, at least—in favor of assimilation as
the only politically viable alternative to the strong push for the wholesale destruction
of Indian culture and Indian reservations.” GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 184.
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governing institutions of the Indian peoples within Indian
country. 32
But the federal judiciary, far from inhibiting or channeling the
overweening growth of this federal power over the Indian peoples, actively
abetted and aided its growth by crafting judicial principles that rendered it
impervious to the Indian peoples’ legal or political challenges.
Furthermore, the contemporary Supreme Court’s schizophrenic federal
trust doctrine remains wedded to the admittedly failed, and
congressionally repudiated, anti-Indian policies of that era. Why the
Supreme Court remains wedded to the federal plenary power doctrine that
arose during that era requires us to re-explore the sad and tortuous history
of the Indian allotment and forced assimilation era.
B. A Brief Digression Criticizing Chief Justice Marshall’s Failure to
More Completely Define His Twin Conceptions of the Federal Trust
Duty and Indian Self-Determination
The three trust generating factors—federal power over Indian
lands and resources, the Indian peoples’ vulnerability to that power, and
the inexorable growth of an overweening federal administrative discretion
over many aspects of Indian life—compelled Chief Justice Marshall to
analogize the historic federal-Indian relationship as like “a ward to his
guardian.” 33 Marshall emphasized Indian treaty-making and diplomacy as
the means of reconciling and regulating the twin concepts of Indian
autonomy or self-determination and the federal guardianship power over
the Indian peoples. 34 While he failed to set definitive substantive limits to
the federal government’s guardianship power over the Indian peoples, he
nonetheless articulated a clear concept of Indian self-determination and
32.
See id. at 166–71 (quoting Hearing on H.R. 7902 Before the H.R.
Comm. Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 428–85 (1934)).
33.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
34.
Marshall’s attitude toward Indian treaty making is clearly expressed
in his remarks regarding the Treaty of Holston between the Cherokee Nation and the
United States:
This treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national character of the
Cherokees, and their right of self-government; thus guarantying
their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of course pledging
the faith of the United States for that protection; has been
frequently renewed, and is now in full force.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 556.
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autonomy as an ideational standard requiring both the state and federal
governments to respect and honor the inherent rights of the Indian peoples.
He thereby compelled the states to do so in his opinion in Worcester v.
Georgia. 35 Conceivably, he could have extended his Worcester treaty
supremacy principle so as to bind future Congresses as well, thus using the
Indian treaty’s negotiated terms and principles to flesh out the legally
enforceable content of the trust-based relationship between the Indian
peoples and the federal government. 36
III. HOW THE SUPREME COURT TRANSFORMED MARSHALL’S
FEDERAL GUARDIANSHIP IDEAL INTO FEDERAL PLENARY
POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS
A. The Demise of Marshall’s Twin Conceptions of the Historic FederalIndian Relationship
Rather than judicially develop Marshall’s twin conceptions of the
federal-Indian relationship, the Supreme Court of the late nineteenth
century actively undermined those conceptions by enlarging, without any
apparent constitutional limit, the federal government’s power over the
Indian peoples’ lives and resources. This judicial enlargement of federal
power over the Indian peoples culminated in the Supreme Court’s 1886
decision in United States v. Kagama. 37

35.
31 U.S. 515.
36.
I earlier criticized, in a slightly different context, Marshall’s failure
to determinatively define the Indian peoples’ legal and political relationship to the
United States:
Pragmatically, Marshall’s tribe served as a protean policy device,
content empty and to be filled in by future federal governments as
the tribe’s guardian. By revisioning the tribe’s role as America’s
ward, future federal guardians could resolve any emerging
contradictions or paradoxes created by the American people’s
changing attitudes towards the Indian peoples and their need for
more Indian land. This device supported the American people’s
growing conviction that the dwindling tribes should not be entitled
to assert exclusive sovereignty over vast expanses of hunting and
roaming lands that could easily accommodate thousands of nonIndian farmers, ranchers and future industrialists.
Cross, supra note 25, at 901–02 (footnote omitted).
37.
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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The Kagama Court upheld the Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885, 38
not on the basis of Congress’ delegated power under the Indian Commerce
Clause as asserted by the United States, but as the exercise of its extraconstitutional guardianship power over the Indian peoples. Without any
hint of irony, Justice Miller’s opinion in Kagama converted Chief Justice
Marshall’s “Indian protectorate” analogy into a license for Congress’
exercise of an extra-constitutional power not subject to judicial review or
limitation:
It seems to us that [the Major Crimes Act] is within the
competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on
the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of
the States where they are found are often their deadliest
enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and
with it the power. This has always been recognized by
the Executive and by Congress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen. 39
The Supreme Court later baldly restated Congress’ extraconstitutional guardianship power over the Indian peoples, describing it as
“plenary” in character, in its 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. 40
Justice White’s opinion for the Court rejected Lone Wolf’s claim that the
“tribal consent” provisions of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge 41
judicially constrained Congress’ power to unilaterally allot the Kiowa and
Comanche’s treaty-established lands. 42 The Kagama and Lone Wolf
decisions effectively ended any hope of continuing Marshall’s tribal
sovereignty doctrine as an effective check on federal governmental
overreaching into the lives and rights of the Indian peoples.

38.
39.
40.
41.

23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885).
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84 (third emphasis added).
187 U.S. 553 (1903).
Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians, 15 Stat. 581

42.

Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 561.

(1867).
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B. How the Supreme Court’s Re-conception of the Federal-Indian Trust
Relationship Facilitated the Late Nineteenth Century Rise of the “Indian
Administrative State”
The Supreme Court’s reformulation of Marshall’s twin
conceptions underlying the federal-Indian trust relationship likewise
facilitated Congress’ de jure and de facto delegation of an almost judicially
unchecked regulatory discretion over the Indian peoples’ lives and
resources. This discretion was given first to the BIA and then later to a
virtual “alphabet soup” of federal regulatory and land management
agencies—the ACOE, the BOR, the F&WS, the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), among others. 43
With the Supreme Court’s acquiescence, if not active support, the
so-called “Indians’ agency”—the BIA—was empowered during the late
nineteenth century to establish the “Indian administrative state.” Through
the exercise of its delegated regulatory powers, the BIA eventually
established a “shadow” government to extend federal control over
virtually every aspect of Indian life within Indian country. 44 It was,
ironically, the bureaucratic result of this new reality of Indian life—the
Indian peoples’ vulnerability to the BIA’s capricious and arbitrary power
to withhold treaty or statutory guaranteed Indian food or clothing rations
to ensure Indian compliance with its regulations—that led the Kagama
Court to accede to the extra-constitutional reality of federal plenary power
over the Indian peoples. 45
The BIA of that era plausibly interpreted its administrative “trust
duty” to the Indian peoples, endorsed by both congressional and judicial
acquiescence, as to “kill the Indian so as to save the [potential American
citizen] within.” 46 By the end of the nineteenth century, virtually all of the
BIA’s regulatory powers and resources were directed toward that goal.
How and why the Indian peoples survived that era of unbridled BIA rule
in Indian country has long baffled Indian historians, sociologists, and
ethnographers. I certainly don’t know the answer to that question, but I
do know that it wasn’t the result of the judicial enforcement of the federal
trust duties and responsibilities the BIA may have owed to the Indian
peoples. 47
43.
See generally Wood, supra note 17, at 139–49.
44.
See generally GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 142–48.
45.
See id. at 153–58.
46.
Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History
and the Nation’s Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 UALR L. REV. 941, 944 (1999)
(internal quotations and footnote omitted).
47.
See Cross, supra note 25, at 916–19.
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IV. HOW THE ACCUMULATED CONGRESSIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE ABUSE OF INDIAN PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
COMPELLED THE MODERN SUPREME COURT TO REDISCOVER
MARSHALL’S TWIN CONCEPTIONS OF THE FEDERAL-INDIAN
RELATIONSHIP
A. Early Judicial Rethinking Regarding the Plenary Power Doctrine
The Supreme Court did act creatively in the early twentieth
century so as to rediscover Marshall’s twin conceptions of the federal trust
and Indian self-determination doctrines. The Court could no longer ignore
the all-too-evident and deepened vulnerability of the Indian peoples to the
unchecked discretion of the federal Indian agencies over their lives and
property. The accumulated administrative abuses heaped on these
dependent peoples forced the Court to resurrect Marshall’s longdisregarded federal guardianship doctrine. 48
Appropriately enough, this new judicial understanding of the
federal trust duty arose in the context of an Indian takings case. Justice
Butler, in his 1938 opinion for the court in United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 49 resurrected Marshall’s characterization of the Indians’ “right of
occupancy . . . [to be] as sacred and as securely safeguarded as is fee simple
absolute title.” 50 In holding that the Shoshone Tribe was entitled to just
compensation for the federal taking of one-half of its reservation as a
resettlement site for another tribe of Indians, Justice Butler seemingly
restricted the federal government’s hitherto unlimited guardianship power
over the Indian peoples. He rejected the federal government’s Lone Wolfbased defense to the tribe’s action, saying the federal government’s Lone
Wolf power “to pass laws regulating alienation and descent and for the
government of the tribe and its people upon the reservation detracts
nothing from the tribe’s ownership, but was reserved for the more
convenient discharge of the duties of the United States as guardian and
sovereign.” 51
B. How the Supreme Court “Hit the Political Wall” in Its Effort to
Rethink the Plenary Power Doctrine
The Shoshone decision seemingly heralded the revival of a
judicially revitalized federal trust doctrine. Such a revitalized doctrine
48.
49.
50.
51.

See generally GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 328–70.
304 U.S. 111 (1938).
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
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must be powerful enough to take account of the deepened vulnerability of
the Indian peoples due to the unwanted history that had accumulated from
failed Indian policies. Such a doctrine would reject that failed history by
judicially ending those twin evils that had spawned it: the judicially
unchecked growth of federal power over the Indian peoples coupled with
the arbitrary exercise of increasingly pervasive administrative discretion
wielded by the BIA, and now other federal agencies, over virtually all
aspects of Indian economic, political, and cultural life in Indian country. 52
But there was to be no new Chief Justice Marshall on the Court,
no jurist strong and principled enough to revive Marshall’s twin
conceptions of the federal-Indian relationships so as to compel the modern
revision of the Court’s clearly wrong-headed Kagama and Lone Wolf
decisions of the late nineteenth century era. Instead, the legacy of the
Shoshone Court’s failed promise is our inheritance of the modern Supreme
Court’s schizophrenic conception that the federal trust doctrine reenacts
the federal plenary power doctrine in the guise of its “generalized” and
“specific” federal trust duty distinctions.
Why the Shoshone Court’s legacy remained unfulfilled is best
explained by Dean Nell Jessup Newton’s analysis of the Indian law
jurisprudence of the late 1940s and 1950s. 53 She cites several intervening
political events as disrupting further development of an Indian rights
focused jurisprudence that began with the Shoshone decision. Newton
cites Congress’ enactment of the Indian Claims Commission Act 54 and the
Indian Tucker Act 55 in 1946 as adversely influencing, if not effectively
preempting, the future judicial development of an independent, judicially
monitored, federal trust doctrine. 56
These two federal jurisdictional acts—generally opening the
federal courts to Indian breach of trust and related takings claims, but on
stringent jurisdictional conditions—fundamentally altered the future
judicial course of the potential development of an adequate and
52.
See Cross, supra note 27, at 466–72.
53.
See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Court of the
Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992).
54.
60 Stat. 1049 (1946).
55.
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 505–08 (1887) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
56.
Newton observes that one could ask, “why it is necessary to focus on
the law created in these ancient claims, if the Indian Claims Commission is no longer
in existence.” Newton, supra note 53, at 776. She answers her own question as
follows: “The answer is that the formalistic rules developed in Indian Claims
Commission cases, especially those rules limiting liability and setting the boundaries
of the permissible, continue to be cited and relied on today, even by the Supreme
Court.” Id. (footnote omitted).
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independent federal trust doctrine premised on common law legal and
equitable principles. The exercise of Congress’ plenary power over the
Indian peoples—expressed as an act of “congressional grace” in allowing
eligible Indians access to federal courts—required the eligible Indian
plaintiffs to accept onerous jurisdictional conditions such as, in the Indian
Claims Commission (“ICC”) context, the “no interest” rule and the
“money damages only” remedy. 57
Although Newton does not say this directly, those contingent
historical and political events help explain today’s deformed and deficient
federal trust and fiduciary duties doctrine. How these events squelched
the further judicial growth of an independent, judicially monitored, federal
trust relationship with the Indian peoples is evidenced, in my mind, by the
Supreme Court’s 1955 opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States. 58
Justice Reed, writing for the Court’s majority, held that federal taking of
aboriginal land titles imposed no just compensation liability on the federal
government. Most commentators regard that decision as highly
deferential to the federal government’s asserted plenary power over Indian
affairs and as seeking, as part of that deferential attitude, to limit the United
States’ financial liability for the uncompensated federal takings of
valuable Indian aboriginal interests in Alaska and elsewhere. 59
Newton seemingly criticizes the federal courts’ Indian breach of
trust claims jurisprudence, developed in the context of the ICC Act’s
unique jurisdictional constraints, as subordinating the Article III judiciary
to a subservient role in determining the legal parameters of federal liability
in the Indian breach of trust claims context. 60 It is not surprising, then,

57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 763–65.
348 U.S. 272 (1955).
See Cross, supra note 27, at 473–77.
Newton illustrates her point by arguing:

Because the Indian Claims Commission Act was designed to
obviate the need for further special jurisdictional acts, the Court of
Claims reasoned that Congress intended that clause 5 [of the ICC
Act] could only encompass the same kinds of claims brought
earlier [under the special Indian jurisdictional acts]. Conveniently
ignoring the many cases upholding the Department of Interior’s
administrative power to govern Indians without the need for
statutory authority, the Court of Claims held that a claim by a tribe
seeking compensation based on actions undertaken by the
Government had to rely on a “treaty, agreement, order or statute
which expressly obligated the United States to perform [any]
services.”
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that today’s Indian trust and fiduciary law subsists in a seeming state of
judicially suspended animation—half alive and half dead. It hangs
suspended, halfway between the old “mother may I sue you” Indian breach
of trust jurisprudence of the ICC era and the modern conception of an
active, affirmative Indian trust and fiduciary law that seeks to divine and
protect the best interests of today’s Indian peoples. 61
V. HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE FEDERAL TRUST DUTY HAS RESULTED IN ITS
DRAMATIC UNDER-ENFORCEMENT IN THE MODERN
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CONTEXT
A. How the Contemporary Supreme Court’s “Two-Track” Conception of
the Federal Trust Doctrine Fails to Ensure “Fair and Honorable”
Dealings Between the Federal Government and the Indian Peoples
Given that it was the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the federal
plenary power doctrine in the late nineteenth century that resulted in the
contemporary subjection of the Indian peoples’ remaining lands and
resources to the broad regulatory discretion of a myriad of federal
agencies, one might think that the Court would be motivated to reimpose
in the contemporary era a “full blooded” trust doctrine that synthesizes
Marshall’s twin conceptions of the historic federal trust duty and Indian
self-determination doctrines. But you would be sorely mistaken if you
were to think that way. Instead, the modern Supreme Court has embarked
on a “two track” approach to re-conceptualizing Marshall’s historic federal
trust doctrine that allows it to “have its cake and eat it too.” In its new
“cake eating” mode, the Supreme Court amiably agrees, at the level of
“track one” of the federal trust doctrine, with the following common law
formulation of fundamental trust and fiduciary principles as declared by
Justice Mason of the Australian High Court:
The critical feature of these relationships is that the
fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or
in the interests of another person in the exercise of a
power or discretion which will affect the interests of that
other person in a legal or practical sense. The relationship
between the parties is therefore one which gives the
Newton, supra note 53, at 778 (quoting Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
v. U.S., 427 F.2d 1194, 1198 (Ct. Cl. 1970)) (footnotes omitted).
61.
See Cross, supra note 27, at 473–77.
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fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or
discretion to the detriment of that other person who is
accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his
position. 62
See, the contemporary Supreme Court would likely say, we do
recognize today Marshall’s historic conception of the federal-Indian
relationship as imposing a “generalized” trust duty on the federal
government to be “fair and honorable” in its dealings with the Indian
peoples. But in its “second track” mode of “having its cake,” the Court
holds that the Indian peoples lack any enforceable legal rights under
Marshall’s historic scheme unless and until Congress specifically confers
statutory or regulatory entitlements to bring legal actions to enforce the
federal government’s “generalized” trust or fiduciary duty to be “fair and
honorable” in its contemporary dealings with the Indian peoples.
B. How the Mitchell I & Mitchell II Decisions Instantiate a “TwoTrack” Federal Trust Doctrine that Undermines Marshall’s Twin
Conceptions of the Historic Federal-Indian Relationship
The contemporary Supreme Court, in its two Mitchell decisions,
created a “two track” federal trust doctrine that judicially reifies the long
suspect legal principles underlying the federal plenary power doctrine
while doing relatively little to promote the contemporary congressional
policy of Indian self-determination. Even worse, it enables the Supreme
Court to commend Justice Mason’s cited circumstantial factors as
establishing, a la Marshall’s twin conceptions of the historic federal-Indian
relationship, a “general trust relationship” between the federal government
and the Indian peoples. 63
But, as the Supreme Court declared in Mitchell I, the wronged
Indian party must establish more, much more it turns out in light of Navajo
Nation, than the mere existence of this “generalized or bare” historical
trust relationship. In Mitchell I, the Court concluded that the Indian timber
allottees had not established the BIA’s liability under the General
Allotment Act for its alleged mismanagement of the allottees’ trust assets.
Because the “allottee, and not the United States, was to manage the land”64
under the General Allotment Act, the Act created only a “limited trust

62.
97 (Austl.).
63.
64.

Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 96–
See GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 331.
445 U.S. at 543.
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relationship between the United States and the allottee that does not
impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources.” 65
But upon remand to the lower court, the Quinault plaintiffs cited
the court’s attention to the Indian Timber Management Act. This so
impressed the Court of Claims that it held that the statute created an
enforceable “specific trust relationship” between the Indian plaintiffs and
the United States. 66 On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower
court’s holding, stating:
In contrast to the bare trust created by the General
Allotment Act, the statutes and regulations now before us
clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to
manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the
Indians. They thereby establish a fiduciary relationship
and define the contours of the United States’ fiduciary
responsibilities. 67
C. Why Indian Advocates Were Surprised by the Supreme Court’s “Two
Track” Reformulation of the Federal Trust Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s relatively few Indian breach of trust
decisions, prior to the two Mitchell decisions, gave no hint of its coming
“two-track” reconception of the federal trust doctrine. Indeed, Indian
advocates may have thought there was just a “single track” duty as
evidenced by the Supreme Court’s earlier rationale and holding in
Seminole Nation v. United States. 68
In Seminole Nation, individual tribal members, analogous to the
Quinault allottees, were entitled by treaty stipulation to receive direct per
capita payments from the interest accrued on a tribal trust fund. But
instead of paying this money to individual tribal members, the federal
government paid it to non-Indian creditors and to the corrupt tribal
treasurer. Borrowing from standard trust law, the Court analogized the
federal government to “a third party who pays money to a fiduciary for the
benefit of the beneficiary, with knowledge that the fiduciary intends to
misappropriate the money.” 69 What is clear from the Mitchell II and
Seminole Nation decisions, read together, is that as a matter of federal
Indian trust law, the BIA or any other similarly situated federal agency
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 542.
Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
316 U.S. 286 (1942).
Id. at 296.
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charged with specific fiduciary duties by law, must structure its
organizational exercise of its discretion so as to be consistent with the
governing statutory directives. 70
D. The Lower Federal Courts’ Struggle to Operationalize the Two-Track
Trust Logic of the Mitchell I & Mitchell II Decisions
Making sense of the Court’s “two-track” trust duty logic defies
easy articulation or paraphrase. Prior to the Court’s decision in Navajo
Nation, the lower courts seemed to interpret that logic in the following
practical terms:
1. Unlike the common law created and defined doctrine
of trust and fiduciary duties, the federal trust duty is
clearly subject to overriding congressional control and
definition. Therefore, absent some governing federal
statute, treaty, or authorized regulatory provision that
creates, defines, and imposes a trust obligation on a
federal obligation to specific Indian beneficiaries, a
federal court may not, by resort of its inherent equitable
powers, create and impose such trust or fiduciary
obligations on any federal agency. 71
2. But a federal court may use common law trust and
fiduciary principles to supplement the “law of the trust”
that is independently established by a specific treaty,
statute, or regulatory provision. Judge Lamberth’s
importation of supplementary common law trust and
fiduciary principles to inform and develop the statutory
trust purposes Congress itself imposed on the Interior and
Treasury departments illustrates this principle. 72 But
while these two “doctrinal sideboards” plausibly
interpreted the two-track logic of the Mitchell decisions,
it became clear to the Supreme Court that the lower courts
were applying its new federal trust doctrine in a practical
manner that opened the courts too widely to Indian breach
of trust claims against the federal government. Even
though the lower courts routinely required Indian
plaintiffs to establish a “context specific trust
70.
71.
72.

See GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 334–35.
See Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 192 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
See Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
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relationship” 73 before they would impose any fiduciary
obligations on the federal government, the Court
considered that far too lax a liability standard for
assessing fair and honorable dealings between the
paramount sovereign and its Indian wards. 74
Lower federal courts struggled to fairly apply this two-track
standard in a manner that took into account the Indian peoples’ practical
dependence on the good faith dealings of the United States. For example,
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pawnee v. United States, held that
the Indian plaintiffs established only a general trust relationship between
themselves and the federal government. Because they failed to cite the
government’s breach of any specific statute or federal regulation regarding
the administration of the Indian plaintiffs’ oil and gas interests, they had
no breach of trust claim against the federal government. 75
The federal statutes and regulations that “place[d] the Secretary .
. . at the center of the leasing of [plaintiffs’] mineral lands” 76 served, under
that court’s application of the two-track logic, to “define the contours of
the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities.” 77 What did the Pawnee
court have to say about the application of common law principles of trust
and fiduciary law that should independently obligate courts to protect the
best interests of the Indian peoples—the admittedly dependent wards of
the federal government?
The Pawnee court held it was not free to “establish different or
higher [fiduciary] standards” 78 because to do so would require the court to
invade “a function solely of Congress or its delegates.” 79 Because, in the
court’s estimation, the cited statutes and regulations did not sufficiently
obligate the government to pay the Indian plaintiffs royalties based on the
highest market value for that trust resource, the court was not free to
“establish different or higher standards.” 80
Interestingly, the Pawnee court makes no mention of its decision’s
potential impact on the affected Indian peoples’ capacity for self-

73.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1563
(10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74.
Id.
75.
Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 191.
76.
Id. at 189.
77.
Id. at 192 (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224) (internal quotations
omitted).
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 192.
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determination, although this matter arose under the 1938 Indian Mineral
Leasing Act and its implementing regulations. Assuming that Indian
mineral development bears directly on the affected Indian peoples’
capacity to achieve meaningful self-determination, it would seem that
active judicial supervision of the federal government’s general trust
obligation to prudently manage those entrusted Indian resources should
discipline the federal trustee to work diligently toward that common goal.
For the federal courts to do so would be consistent with their historic
solicitude for the Indians’ interests, given their deepened vulnerability to
both federal and private power in today’s economic and technological
setting where “information is power” and the Indian peoples lack
meaningful access to either information or power.
Instead, the Pawnee decision reprises the “two-tier” federal trust
duty analysis derived from the Mitchell I and Mitchell II decisions. Tribal
plaintiffs must first show the existence of a “general trust relationship”
between themselves and the federal government. Then, they must show
the existence of a situation-specific trust relationship between themselves
and the federal government as well as an actionable breach of that
relationship.
My essay’s focus is on the impact of these decisions on the federal
government’s contemporary trust obligation to promote Indian selfdetermination, not necessarily on the legal ability of the Indian peoples to
obtain a money damages remedy against the federal government. My
concern is that the Supreme Court will “throw out the baby of Indian selfdetermination” in order to cool the “bath water” of potentially untold
Indian breach of trust claims that may arise in the Indian selfdetermination context. In my view, the Court’s decision in Navajo Nation
is a doctrinal preemptive strike designed to prevent Indian advocates from
financially exploiting the likely multifarious instances of incompetent or
indifferent federal Indian trust administrators who may fail to effectively
or prudently promote the self-determination interests of the Indian
peoples. Partly due to its traditional public fisc protecting responsibility
in this regard, I argue that the Supreme Court, in its Navajo Nation
decision, has radically reinterpreted the contemporary Indian selfdetermination policy. It judicially re-characterizes that policy as an
additional federal jurisdictional barrier to Indian breach of trust claims.
By subsuming the contemporary Indian self-determination doctrine into
its 1950s era Indian jurisprudence, the Court emphasized its fisc protecting
role via its stringent limitation on the Indian peoples’ actionable claims
against the federal government and risks reducing Indian selfdetermination to a near dead letter.
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E. A Brief Digression on How the Supreme Court’s Misperception of
Indian Trust Agencies’ Competing “Public Representational”
Responsibilities May Allow Them to Disregard Their Trust or Fiduciary
Duties to the Indian Peoples
The Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Nevada v. United States 81
substantially re-worked the agency discretion component of the federal
trust doctrine. The federal government sought belatedly in that matter to
fulfill its trust duty to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe. 82 It did so by filing
suit to reopen a 1913 Nevada water rights decree known as the “Orr Ditch”
decree. In that earlier water rights litigation, the federal government had
admittedly failed to claim, on behalf of the tribe, “sufficient waters of the
Truckee River . . . [for] the maintenance and preservation of Pyramid
Lake, [and for] the maintenance of the lower reaches of the Truckee River
as a natural spawning ground for fish.” 83
But Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court, rejected the
federal government’s admitted breach of trust as sufficient grounds for reopening the Orr Ditch decree. He responded to the federal government’s
argument, stating that “[w]hile [private trust and fiduciary principles]
undoubtedly provide useful analogies . . . they cannot be regarded as
finally dispositive of the issues . . . [particularly when] [t]hese concerns
have been traditionally focused on the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the
Department of the Interior.” 84 In Rehnquist’s mind, federal agencies,
other than perhaps the BIA or IHS, clearly “cannot follow the fastidious
standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his single
beneficiary solely by representing . . . conflicting interests without the
beneficiary’s consent.” 85
Given the reality and complexity of today’s federal agencies
publicly representing Indian and non-Indian interests that are potentially
in competition, Rehnquist opined that the federal trust doctrine must be reworked so as to accommodate the broadened public representational duties
of agencies such as the BOR. Rehnquist makes this new context for
evaluating the federal trust duty crystal clear: “The government does not
‘compromise’ its obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to

81.
463 U.S. 110 (1983).
82.
See id. at 118.
83.
Id. at 119 (quoting App. to Pet. Cert. at 155a–56a, Nevada, 463 U.S.
110) (internal quotations omitted).
84.
Id. at 127.
85.
Id. at 128.
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represent by the mere fact that it simultaneously performs another task for
another interest that Congress has obligated it by statute to do.” 86
Given the Supreme Court’s new public representational context,
does this mean that so-called “non-Indian” federal agencies—the BOR,
F&WS, USFS, or NPS—have broad discretion in their treatment of the
Indian peoples who, like other constituent groups, are entitled to fair public
representation of their interests by those agencies, but only within the
confines of their general statutory and regulatory mandates?87 In the
absence of some particular statutory, treaty, or regulatory provision
singling out affected Indian peoples for agency “trust duty” treatment, I
am afraid that may be the case.88
But achieving tribal self-determination will require this “alphabet
soup” of federal agencies to do much more than implement, consistent
with governing executive orders, cursory tribal consultations with those
Indian peoples who may be severely affected by their proposed projects
and programs. Indeed, current psychological research concludes that such
anemic, and potentially insincere, means of empowering hitherto
powerless groups may do more harm than good. Ms. Shauhin Talesh uses
federal agencies’ “tribal consultation” processes as an example of how to
disempower people:
Learned helplessness has been applied in . . . the federal
government’s consultations with Native American tribes.
Despite the proliferation of tribal consultation
requirements by federal statutes and policies, Native
Americans’ suggestions and requests have been
repeatedly “disregarded, discounted, misunderstood, or
ignored when they are solicited.” Consequently, the
Native Americans have developed a somewhat
submissive, passive approach to such negotiations
because their suggestions are consistently ignored. After
years of failed negotiations, tribes begin to develop a
“‘learned helplessness’ response, after years of being
taught that whatever they say, the only thing worth
spending energy on is learning to cope with the imposition
of unacceptable alternatives.”
In response, the
government may “interpret the resulting tribal nonresponsiveness
as
intransigence,
or
hostility
(appropriately), and may in the end make decisions in
86.
87.
88.

Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128.
See id. at 141–42.
See Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d 1325.
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reaction to those interpretations instead of in reaction to
tribal suggestions (inappropriately).” This situation leads
to feelings of lack of control, passivity, and
submissiveness which, in turn, are likely to cause further
damage to Native American interests. 89
Doubtless, there have been many successful tribal-federal consultations
that have resulted in the alteration of federal projects and programs so as
to genuinely accommodate Indian concerns and interests. But, insofar as
federal agencies retain the ultimate discretion to disregard the Indian
peoples’ legitimate self-determination interests, such government-togovernment consultations are not an adequate substitute for a judicially
supervised and enforced federal trust duty to realize those selfdetermination goals. 90
VI. REINTERPRETING THE FACTS AND ISSUES AT STAKE IN
NAVAJO NATION: READING THE FEDERAL TRUST DUTY AND
INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION DOCTRINES AS
COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING
CONCEPTS
A. My Plan and Rationale for Analyzing Navajo Nation
My basic argument, so far, has been that Marshall’s original twin
concepts of the federal trust duty and Indian self-determination co-exist in
a fundamental means-end relationship: the shared goal, as reflected in
America’s “constitutional” documents of federal Indian law—its Indian
treaties, Indian trade and intercourse legislation, and Marshall’s Indian law
opinions—asserts the federal trust duty as the means to ensure the
continued cultural and social survival of the Indian peoples. To restore
Indian self-determination as both the practical and logical goal to be
realized by a revitalized federal trust doctrine forces me to confront the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Navajo Nation. That decision, in my
estimation, seeks to judicially sever the twin concepts of Indian selfdetermination and the federal trust duty by judicially restating them as

89.
Shauhin A. Talesh, Breaking the Learned Helplessness of Patients:
Why MCOs Should Be Required to Disclose Financial Incentives, 26 L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. 49, 83–84 (2002) (quoting Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian
Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of
Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 28 (1999–2000)) (footnotes omitted).
90.
Id. at 83.
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inherently antagonistic and incompatible goals of contemporary federal
Indian law.
In responding to this challenge, I borrow from Professor Paul
McHugh’s critique of the contemporary New Zealand judiciary’s inability
to reconcile its inherited common law conception of national sovereignty
with the Maori peoples’ lawsuits to enforce “treaty principles,”
particularly the Maori peoples’ right of self-determination as arguably
established by the Maori version of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. 91 That
judiciary’s rock solid commitment to its late nineteenth century common
law conception of an “indivisible sovereignty” 92 vested in the
contemporary New Zealand government precludes it from giving legal
credence to the Maori peoples’ claims that they, like the Indian peoples of
America, possess inherent and treaty-recognized rights of selfgovernance. 93
McHugh concludes that only the fundamental reconstruction of
the inherited “common law mind” 94 of New Zealand’s judiciary will
enable it to “constitutionally” view the Maori version of the 1840 Treaty
of Waitangi as a legal document on par with New Zealand’s other sources
of constitutional legitimacy. 95 He does not hold out much hope for the
success of such a project, and he counsels the Maori peoples to politically
bypass the unresponsive New Zealand judiciary and take their case for
self-determination directly to the New Zealand Parliament and people.96 I
apply McHugh’s conception of the reconstructed judicial mind in a reverse
sense in arguing for the contemporary American judiciary’s restoration of
Marshall’s twin “constitutional” conception of the federal trust and Indian
self-determination doctrines. Contrary to the New Zealand experience, it
was the United States Supreme Court’s late nineteenth century rejection
and subordination of the Indian peoples’ original sovereignty, in favor of
its federal plenary power doctrine, that vaulted the federal government into
its present day role in federal Indian law. The Court’s recent decision in
Navajo Nation, in my estimation, mechanically restates that doctrine in the
guise of federal sovereign immunity to suit in the context of the Indian
breach of trust litigation.
My focus on the Indian self-determination component of that
decision may require a brief explanation and a personal disclaimer.
91.
See P.G. McHugh, Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown
Sovereignty in New Zealand, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 69 (2002).
92.
Id. at 82.
93.
See id. at 82–86.
94.
Id. at 78.
95.
See id. at 78–82.
96.
See McHugh, supra note 91, at 98–99.
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Frankly, I am not that interested in whether Indian peoples may recover
money damages from the federal government for its alleged breach of its
trust obligations to the Indian peoples. I don’t believe that money can ever
compensate for the accumulated wrongs inflicted by the federal
government on the Indian peoples.
However, I do care very much about establishing the appropriate
judicial regard and understanding of the complementary roles to be played
by Marshall’s twin conceptions of the Indian self-determination and the
federal trust duty in the modern conception of federal Indian law. For
these reasons, I focus on the Supreme Court’s reevaluation of the Indian
self-determination doctrine. I especially analyze this decision’s potential
for the judicial jettisoning of its role as the Indian peoples’ last line of
defense to the potential abuse of the federal guardianship power.
B. The Basic Facts of the Navajo Nation Decision
The facts of this case are relatively straightforward. The Navajo
Nation entered into a lease agreement in 1964 with the predecessor in
interest to Peabody Coal Company for coal mining on tribal lands. The
coal company agreed to pay a per ton royalty rate of $0.375. The Interior
Secretary was authorized to adjust the royalty rate to a “reasonable” level
on the twentieth anniversary of that lease. As that adjustment date
approached, the tribe discovered the market price of coal had risen and the
royalty was then equivalent to about two percent of the gross proceeds.
No one disputed that the existing royalty rate was well below the
prevailing market-based royalty rates. 97
Tribal negotiations with the coal company were unsuccessful in
resolving the adjusted royalty rate and other pending issues relating to the
potentially amended coal leases. So the tribe asked the Interior
Department to resolve the royalty rate issue and set a fair market value for
the tribe’s amended royalty rate. The Bureau of Mines analyzed the fair
market value of the Navajo coal and recommended a royalty rate of twenty
percent as the new rate in the amended coal leases. The lower level
officials of the BIA adopted this recommended royalty rate and the Navajo
Area Director notified the coal company of its proposed decision.
But the coal company appealed that decision to Mr. John Fritz, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs. He affirmed the decision
to require a twenty percent royalty rate in any amended Navajo coal leases.
Fritz’s decision was later withdrawn by Donald P. Hodel, the Interior
Secretary. Both the Navajo people and the coal company were informed
97.

Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 495–96.
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by Fritz “that a decision on th[e] appeal is not imminent[,] and [the
Secretary] urge[d] them to continue with efforts to resolve this matter in a
mutually agreeable fashion.” 98 However, the tribe was not informed that
there had been “numerous contacts” between lobbyists for the Peabody
Coal Company and Mr. Hodel during this time period. These contacts had
resulted in a secret secretarial decision in favor of the Peabody Coal
Company. 99
The tribe sued, claiming that the Secretary’s action was in the best
interests of the Peabody Coal Company, not the Navajo people as required
by the federal trust duty. The federal appeals court agreed with the tribe,
holding that Mitchell II’s federal “control and supervision” requirement
over Indian trust assets was met in this case, and therefore Hodel’s action
in “‘suppress [ing] and conceal[ing]’ the decision of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary [for Indian Affairs]” 100 had violated the fiduciary’s fundamental
duty of loyalty to its beneficiary. 101 That breach of trust by the federal
government, the lower court held, “is subject to remedy by assessment of
damages resulting from the breach of trust.” 102
C. A Brief Summary of the Oral Arguments in Navajo Nation
Reconstructing the “judicial mind” on a given legal topic
sometimes occurs in the oral argument phase of a case that presents hard
questions for judicial resolution. Personally, I am not sure whether the
oral arguments in Navajo Nation really offered the counsel for the Navajo
Nation a fair chance to educate the court about the proper relationship
between the federal trust duty and Indian self-determination doctrines. By
contrast, I believe the counsel for the federal government effectively
exploited the Navajo Nation’s breach of trust claim against the United
States for $600 million in damages. He used that claim as an opportunity
to re-characterize the Indian self-determination doctrine as a practical
factor to be weighed in the Court’s threshold jurisdictional determination
as to whether the federal government owes any trust or fiduciary duties to
the affected Indian people in a particular context. For this reason, I briefly
cite the exchange between the Court and the respective counsels during
the oral argument in this case.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the government’s appeal from
the Federal Circuit’s decision and set the matter for oral argument on
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 497 (quoting App. 117) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 498.
Id. at 501 (quoting Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1332).
Id.
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 501–02.
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December 2, 2002. 103 Mr. Edwin Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General,
presented the oral argument on behalf of the United States. He invited the
Court to rule against the Navajo Nation on the grounds that the Interior
Secretary had not abused his agency’s regulatory discretion over Indian
trust resources and that the tribe had failed to demonstrate any
vulnerability to whatever missteps taken by the Secretary in the procedural
administration of regulatory duties in this matter. Mr. Kneedler’s basic
argument to the Court is summed up in his opening statement: “Because
there was no violation of any act of Congress or regulation of an executive
department, much less one that could fairly be interpreted as mandating
the payment of damages by the Government, there is no cause of action in
this case under the Tucker Act.” 104
He reiterated his basic assertion in response to Justice O’Connor’s
question whether Secretary Hodel’s private conversations with lobbyists
for the Peabody Coal Company provided the basis for a breach of trust suit
by the Navajo Nation. “No” was his emphatic answer. 105 At best, he
replied, these facts may provide the tribes with an APA-based action to set
aside the coal lease in question, but the tribe has declined to take that
action. 106
His narrow view of the federal trust duty in this instance, Kneedler
argued, was occasioned by two factors. First, broad discretion was vested
in the Interior Secretary by the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act. Second,
the Navajo Nation exercised the lead and determinative role in negotiating
the Peabody coal lease at issue. 107 These two factors, in his mind,
distinguished this case legally and factually from the federal “control and
supervision” trust duty standard established in Mitchell II. Unlike the BIA
timber managers in Mitchell II, the Interior Secretary was clothed in this
instance with broad discretion to “‘flesh-out’ [via regulations] the regime
for . . . approval of [Indian mineral] leases.” 108
Given that the Secretary’s regulations established only a minimum
royalty payment requirement, the fact that he ultimately approved a
tribally negotiated royalty rate of 12.5 percent meant he had clearly
exceeded the lower bound of the trust responsibilities to the affected
Indians.

103. See id. at 488.
104. Oral Argument at 4, Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (available in 2002
WL 31741814).
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. at 4–6.
107. See id. at 18.
108. Id. at 17.
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But it was Kneedler’s tribal self-determination argument that
seemed to attract the most attention from the Justices. Given that the
IMLA’s goal was to promote direct tribal negotiations with private
development interests, Kneedler explained that the Secretary
understandably sought to promote such tribal negotiation opportunities
through his adoption of minimal regulatory standards. Such a regulatory
strategy helped ensure that tribal negotiations would proceed without
undue federal interference or involvement.
He encapsulated, in
paraphrase, the Secretary’s “pro-self-determination” stance as follows: “It
is clearly up to the tribal negotiators and lessee to go beyond these
minimums if they so choose.” 109
But one unidentified Justice directly challenged Kneedler’s “the
tribe did it” argument by questioning whether mere regulatory compliance
with minimal trust duty standards relieved the Secretary of any
independent fiduciary duties over and above this regulatory minimum:
Doesn’t the Secretary of Interior have to meet the common law fiduciary
duty of “reasonable, prudent care no matter what the regs [say]”? 110
Kneedler disagreed, contending that Mitchell II-type liability arises only
from an express statutory direction to the Secretary to “[assure] a particular
amount of income for the tribe under the circumstances.” 111 He pointed
out that any such express statutory direction was clearly absent in this case.
The Justice sought to inject, with some humor, a Mitchell II-type
analogy. Suppose, the Justice asked Kneedler, we equate the Peabody
lobbyists who met with the Secretary to “anti-tree termites” let loose by
BIA foresters to “eat away” the ethical timber that supports the federal
trust duty? Kneedler replied, without humor, that the Justice’s
hypothetical “anti-tree termites” would pose an immediate threat to a real
physical asset. For that reason, such federal behavior would likely
constitute a breach of the trust duty even in the absence of a statutory
directive to refrain from such behavior. By comparison, Kneedler
continued, the complained of ex parte communications between the
Secretary and the lobbyists for Peabody Coal posed only a remote and
ultimately meaningless procedural threat to the Navajo’s coal resource. 112
When it was the turn of Mr. Paul Frye, legal counsel for the
Navajo Nation, he had been boxed in by Kneedler’s legal arguments. The
Court’s majority seemed to accept Kneedler’s characterization of the
Secretary’s admittedly shabby actions as actually promoting the Navajo
109. Oral Argument at 18–19, Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (available in
2002 WL 31741814).
110. Id. at 20.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 23–24.
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Nation’s exercise of its self-determination by requiring it to return to the
negotiating table with Peabody Coal. If one accepts Kneedler’s
characterization of the effects of the Secretary’s actions as having the
effect of actually promoting the Navajo Nation’s lead role in negotiating
its coal lease with Peabody Coal, then it is plausible to argue that any
procedural missteps by the Secretary were subsumed into his regulatory
approval of the coal lease the tribe freely negotiated with Peabody Coal
Company.
Therefore, many of the Court’s questions to Frye focused on the
tribe’s role, not the Secretary’s role, in managing and controlling the lease
negotiations with Peabody Coal Company. One Justice asked Frye, given
the IMLA’s language, whether Secretary Hodel had not been obligated to
take “reasonable” account of the impact of the proposed twenty percent
royalty rate on both Peabody Coal Company and the Navajo Nation.113
But it was Justice Ginsburg’s questions about the tribe’s negotiation of an
eight percent severance tax on coal to be mined by Peabody Coal under
the amended lease that truly confused the federal trust issue with the tribe’s
independent exercise of sovereign taxing powers over tribal mineral
lessees. By adding together the 12.5 percent royalty rate approved by the
Secretary and the tribally negotiated eight percent severance tax, Ginsburg
asked Frye, didn’t the tribe succeed in negotiating a better deal via selfdetermination than if the Secretary had unilaterally imposed the twenty
percent royalty recommended by lower level federal officials? 114
My purpose in re-hashing the oral argument is not to critique how
well the respective counsel did in presenting their arguments to the Court.
Each of them did as well as they could in light of their resources at hand.
My purpose is to show how the tribal self-determination doctrine was
seized on by the Court to avoid the tribe’s breach of trust claim in this
context. Kneedler’s “the Indian tribe did it” argument seemed to be met
with great receptivity by those members of the Court who desired to
further narrow the reach of the federal trust doctrine. By re-characterizing
the federal trust duty as merely a procedural obligation to comply with
minimal regulatory requirements of secretarial review and approval over
tribally negotiated mineral lease agreements, Kneedler sought to shift the
financial and practical risks of tribal development to those Indian peoples
who seek to use the development of their mineral resources as one means
of realizing their economic self-determination. 115

113. See id. at 39.
114. Oral Argument at 43–45, Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (available in
2002 WL 31741814).
115. See generally id. at 3–27.
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D. How the Application of My Proposed New Judicial Canon of
Construction May Have “Reconstructed” Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion in
Navajo Nation
The final paragraph of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Navajo
Nation illustrates the ultimate judicial result of the fundamental
misapprehension by the Court’s majority of the complementary character
of the federal trust duty and Indian self-determination doctrines:
However one might appraise the Secretary’s intervention
in this case, we have no warrant from any relevant statute
or regulation to conclude that his conduct implicated a
duty enforceable in an action for damages under the
Indian Tucker Act. The judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is accordingly
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 116
Ironically, while the three dissenting justices explicitly call for a
“balanced standard” 117 that appropriately interprets the “tension between
IMLA’s two objectives” 118 of “greater tribal responsibility” 119 and the
Secretary’s obligation to “ensure that negotiated leases ‘maximize tribal
revenues,”’ 120 they fail to express any such standard beyond a few
platitudinous remarks about the need for a “modest standard []” 121 that
mediates this supposed tension. Beyond criticizing the Court’s majority
for “giv[ing] the whole hog” 122 to the “interest of tribal autonomy” 123
expressed in the IMLA, the dissent says little about how to reconcile the
supposed tension between the federal trust duty and Indian selfdetermination. Indeed, the dissent seems to agree generally with the
majority’s view that these two doctrines are at war with one another. The
dissent agrees that there is a “zero sum” relationship between the two when
116. 537 U.S. at 514.
117. Id. at 518 (Souter, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting).
118. Id. at 517.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
195, 200 (1985)).
121. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 518 (Souter, Stevens & O’Connor,
JJ., dissenting). Justice Souter, for example, characterizes “[t]he Secretary’s approval
power . . . [as] a significant component of the Government’s general trust
responsibility.” Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 518.
123. Id.
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Justice Souter writes, “The more stringent the substantive obligation of the
Secretary, the less the scope of tribal responsibility.” 124 The converse of
Justice Souter’s principle—the greater the tribal responsibility assigned by
statute, the less the scope of the federal trust duty—is doubtless true as
well.
Why am I practically troubled by the dissent’s seemingly
reasonable call for a “balanced standard” that mediates the supposed
tension between the federal trust duty and the Indian self-determination
doctrine? Because the “zero sum” analysis of any issue practically and
logically excludes any possibility of a balanced standard that will
supposedly resolve the tensions presented therein. 125 Post Navajo Nation,
Indian advocates are advised by the Supreme Court to embark on an
ultimately fruitless and disheartening quest for the “balanced standard”
that will supposedly resolve, when all has been said and done, what is an
irreconcilable “zero sum” conflict.
But the escape from what I consider to be a false and contrived
conflict between these two doctrines—designed to further dampen Indian
breach of trust suits that may open the federal government to potentially
open-ended liability for the bad acts of administrative officials—is
relatively simple and will further the joint and “non-zero sum” interests of
both the Indian peoples and the federal government. 126 I apply below my
proposed standard to reanalyze the issues raised in this matter. This
standard seeks to reinforce the common “non-zero sum” interests of the
Indian peoples and the federal government, thereby avoiding the
internecine and irreconcilable conflict needlessly generated by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Navajo Nation.
Applying my new proposed non-zero sum approach to the issues
presented in Navajo Nation is neither radical nor innovative in character.
At level one, it simply recapitulates the well established concept that
Congress, not the federal courts, should, as the Indian peoples’ trustee,
determine the nature and contours of contemporary Indian selfdetermination policy. At level two, it takes seriously Congress’
contemporary Indian self-determination policy so as to give a “non-zero
sum” interpretation to the issues raised in Navajo Nation.
124. Id.
125. Robert Wright makes the cogent point that “common conceptions of
justice and social equality” don’t just “magically prevail ‘in the end’ without extra
guidance.” WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 84–85. His logic applies directly, in my mind,
to the need for a “full blooded” federal trust doctrine that forces the federal Indian
agencies to engage in meaningful “government-to-government” relations with the
Indian peoples so as to actively promote the goals of Indian self-determination.
126. Id.
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I embody this “non-zero sum” principle in a new Indian canon of
judicial construction. This new canon is, itself, the practical and logical
corollary of Congress’ declared “non-zero sum” approach to Indian selfdetermination. Element one of Congress’ approach encourages the Indian
peoples to engage in self-help efforts to achieve their particular vision of
economic or social self-determination. Element two of its approach
assures the Indian peoples that the needed technical or financial support
will be forthcoming from the federal government to assist them in their
self-determination efforts.
The judicial adoption of my proposed new Indian canon of
construction would substantially promote Congress’ declared “non-zero
sum” approach to Indian self-determination. First, it would restore Indian
self-determination to its rightful place in federal Indian common law as
the “mirror image” doctrinal complement to Marshall’s original “Indian
protectorate” concept of the federal trust duty. 127 Second, it would provide
the essential “judicially-backed” incentive to the federal trustee to be an
active, engaged manager who consciously shapes his discretionary
choices, ex ante, so as to select those projects, activities, or investments
that will promote the best interests of his wards—the Indian peoples.
Third, it will promote “non-zero sum” collaboration and responsibilitysharing agreements between the federal government and the Indian
peoples for new and truly innovative self-determination undertakings.
Because the Indian peoples will not risk the loss of their trustee’s informed
and active help and support, given their choice to participate in these new
joint undertakings, the goal of Indian self-determination will be
substantially furthered. Third, a judicially backed “non-zero sum”
approach to Indian self-determination may well dampen the number of
future instances where federal administrators, due to their possible
inefficient or negligent behaviors, expose the federal government to Indian
breach of trust claims.
This is because responsibility-sharing
arrangements in the “non-zero sum” context are based on shared
information flows, mutual transparency of intent and purpose within joint
decision making matrices, and the parties’ orientation to maintaining a
long-term relationship that seeks to avoid any disruptions based on short
run misunderstandings or conflicts between the parties. 128
127. Referring to the Indian peoples, Marshall held that “weak state[s], in
order to provide for [their] safety, may place [themselves] under the protection of one
more powerful, without stripping [themselves] of the right of government, and ceasing
to be . . . state[s].” Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
128. Robert Wright could have been speaking about the long and troubled
federal-Indian relationship when he asks us to assess the movement from the “zero
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My proposed Indian judicial canon of construction would require
federal courts to presume that Indian self-determination statutes preserve
the historic rights Indians have traditionally enjoyed under the federal trust
relationship, unless Congress clearly expresses its intent to the contrary
within the “four corners” of a given Indian statute. This canon would
apply to all self-determination statutes, including the 1938 Indian Mineral
Leasing Act as it was so characterized by the Supreme Court in Navajo
Nation. If my proposed Indian canon of construction had been employed
by the Court’s analysis in Navajo Nation, I believe its decision would have
been different in the following regards.
First, Justice Ginsburg would decide the “expert analysis” issue
differently. Through Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, the Court held that
Interior Secretary Hodel was free to disregard the Bureau of Mines’ expert
assessment of the appropriate market value of the Navajo coal reserves
because no express statutory or regulatory provision required him to
conduct an independent expert analysis of those Indian resources. 129
Under my proposed “non-zero sum” analysis, Justice Ginsburg would
have held, as Judge Schall held in the lower court’s concurrence, that
Secretary Hodel breached his fiduciary duty to be adequately informed
about the market value of the Navajo’s coal reserve so as to make a
sum” to the “non-zero sum” society over the very long term:
As we’ve seen, in the process of expanding, non-zero-sumness has
brought not only more respect for more people, but more liberty
for more people. The point isn’t just—as thinkers as Adam Smith
have been saying since the eighteenth century—that free markets
are best operated by free minds. The point is that the ongoing
evolution of information technology heightens this synergy,
underscores it, makes something rulers can less and less afford to
ignore.
The world remains in many ways a horribly immoral place by
almost anyone’s standard. Still, the standards we apply now are
much tougher than the standards of old. Now we ask not only that
people not be literally enslaved, but that they be paid a decent wage
and work under sanitary conditions. Now we ask not only that
dissidents not be beheaded en masse, but that they be able to say
whatever they want to whomever they want. It is good that we thus
agitate for further progress, and all signs are that this agitation goes
with the flow of history. Still, it is hard, after pondering the full
sweep of history, to resist the conclusion that—in some important
ways, at least—the world now stands at its moral zenith to date.
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 208 (footnotes omitted).
129. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 511.
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decision on the royalty rate issue that helped promote the joint, “non-zero
sum” interests shared by the federal and Indian governments in realizing
the economic self-determination goals of the Navajo people. 130
Second, Justice Ginsburg would decide the issue of Secretary
Hodel’s ex parte contacts with the lobbyist for Peabody Coal differently
under my proposed Indian canon of judicial construction. Justice
Ginsburg actually held that Secretary Hodel was free to meet with
whomever he wants, absent an express statutory or regulatory prohibition
against his doing so. 131 Under my proposed “non-zero sum” analysis,
Justice Ginsburg would hold that Secretary Hodel’s setting aside of the
expert-recommended twenty percent royalty rate for the Navajo coal,
based on his clearly disloyal private contacts with the coal company’s
lobbyist, would have constituted a breach of trust as held by the lower
federal court.
Third, Justice Ginsburg would decide the issue regarding the
Senate Report’s express language exhorting Secretary Hodel to manage
the Navajo’s coal resources so as to “give the Indians the greatest return
from their property,” 132 differently under my proposed Indian canon of
judicial construction. Justice Ginsburg actually held that this cited report
language was inapplicable to the case because it “overstate[d]” 133 the
Secretary’s fiduciary duties and because its use was an effort to impose an
“extratextual” 134 criteria of analysis to the Secretary’s actions. Under my
proposed “non-zero sum” analysis, Justice Ginsburg would hold Secretary
130. Non-zero sumness is viewed by Robert Wright as an inherent “selfregenerating” source that reinforces our natural tendency to cooperate and work
together for our mutual benefit:
Non-zero-sumness is a kind of potential. Like what physicists call
“potential energy,” it can be tapped or not tapped, depending on
how people behave. But there’s a difference. When you tap
potential energy—when you, say, nudge a bowling ball off a
cliff—you’ve reduced the amount of potential energy in the world.
Non-zero-sumness, in contrast, is self-regenerating. To realize
non-zero-sumness—to turn the potential into positive sums—often
creates even more potential, more non-zero-sumness. That is the
reason that the world once boasted only a handful of bacteria and
today features IBM, Coca-Cola, and the United Nations.
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 339.
131. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 513.
132. Id. at 516 (Souter, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Sen.
Rpt. 75-985, at 2 (1937)) (internal quotations omitted).
133. Id. at 511–12 n.16.
134. Id.
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Hodel in breach of his fiduciary obligations to the Navajo people for
failing to use his discretionary power to secure a financial return
commensurate with the expert-determined market value of the Navajo’s
coal resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
The judicial adoption of my proposed “non-zero sum” analysis,
embodied in my proposed Indian cannon of judicial construction, would
achieve a reasonable and practical synthesis that restores Marshall’s twin
conceptions of Indian self-determination and the federal trust duty to their
rightful, respective roles in contemporary federal Indian law. I hope my
brief essay arguing for the reconstruction of the “judicial mind” regarding
the federal trust duty in an age of tribal self-determination advances the
academic discussion of this issue.

